Presupposition and accommodation by Romoli, Jacopo
Presupposition and accommodation∗
Jacopo Romoli
University of Ulster
Uli Sauerland
Zentrum für Allgemeine
Sprachwissenschaft
to appear in Routledge Handbook of Pragmatics eds. Barron, Steen, and Yueguo
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Projection & Dynamic Semantics 7
2.1 Projecting, Suspending, and Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Accounting for projection and non-projection . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.1 Suspension as local accommodation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.2 Updating the context compositionally . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Extensions and Challenges to Dynamic Semantics 15
3.1 Asymmetry of and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Conditional presuppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 Differences among triggers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4 Differences among quantifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4 Concluding remarks 24
∗We thank [TO BE ADDED] . This work was supported in part by German Federal Ministry for
Education and Research (BMBF Grant Nr. 01UG1411).
1
Jacopo Romoli and Uli Sauerland
1 Introduction
A basic discovery of research in semantics, pragmatics and their interface is that the
meaning of an utterance is not always a single, unified whole, but can be divided
into different components of meaning. This chapter addresses one such division: the
division between presupposed and asserted content. Whether this division aligns
with that of semantics and pragmatics is a matter of controversy, with some theories
pulling presuppositions more towards the semantic side while others considering
them more as part of the pragmatic realm.1 All theories of presuppositions, however,
involve some combination of semantic and pragmatic elements in their account,
making the presupposed/asserted content distinction of of the most emblematic
phenomenon of the semantic/pragmatic interface. The divide between presupposed
and asserted aspects of meaning, originally observed by the German philosopher
Gottlob Frege (Frege 1892), plays a role for the interpretation of an utterance in two
ways. First, presupposed and asserted content can interact differently with other
utterances in a discourse. Second, the presupposed and asserted content of parts of a
complex utterance can also interact differently with other parts in the compositional
build-up of utterance meaning. The division between these two types of content
is, however, not as rigid as we would expect. In particular, in some cases, it is
possible for presupposed content to acquire properties of asserted content. For these
cases, an ‘Accommodation’ operation has been hypothesized and this is the second
topic of this chapter. Evidence for Accommmodation as well as for the division
between presupposed and asserted content comes both from the discourse properties
of complete utterances, and the compositional interpretation of complex utterances.
In the remainder of this section, we introduce data from the discourse level. In the
second section, we turn to evidence from complex utterances, and at the same time
introduce the framework of Dynamic Semantics which arguably represents the most
influential account of these data. In the final section, we discuss some important
challenges to the Dynamic Semantics framework. As these later development show,
the research on presuppositions and accommodation remains one of the most debated
topic in the semantics/pragmatics literature. Moreover, recently presuppositions have
been investigated more and more with psycholinguistic methods, also in comparison
to other semantic/pragmatic inferences like scalar implicatures. This experimental
work has brought new important data in the theoretical debate and contributed even
more to make this an exciting time to study these phenomena.
1 The distinction between semantics and pragmatics is, of course, in itself controversial. A simple
way to characterise the distinction is in terms of meaning encoded in words and morphemes and
the way they are put together, on the one hand, and further inferences derived from the hearer by
reasoning over the speaker’s communicative intentions; see Schlenker to appear and Stalnaker 2014
for discussion.
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Consider a first piece of evidence for the division of presupposed and asserted
content at the utterance level. As participants of conversations, we draw a variety of
inferences from utterances. Imagine, for instance, to be in a situation in which you
do not know that you have a sister; imagine further that you are told the sentence in
(1-a) or that in (1-b). It is clear that in both cases you would equally conclude that
you have a sister.
(1) a. You have a sister and she is awesome.
b. Your sister is awesome.
We also have the intuition, however, that this same piece of information is conveyed
differently in (1-a) versus (1-b). For instance, it appears to be a natural and legitimate
conversational move to object to (1-b) using (2). However, (the first part of) (2)
appears to be an odd response to (1-a) (Shannon 1976, von Fintel 2008). That is,
the type of discourse move in (2) appears appropriate only in response to (1-b).
(2) Hey wait a minute! I didn’t know I have a sister!
This difference tells us that the same inference − that the hearer has a sister − can
have a different discourse status if drawn from a sentence like (1-a) versus one like
(1-b). And this difference is one of the arguments for treating this inference as
having different natures in (1-a) versus (1-b): if we can felicitously use a discourse
move like (2) the relevant inference is considered to be a presupposition.2,3
To illustrate this difference further consider a sentence like (3-a): from (3-a) we
typically derive both the inference in (3-b) and that in (3-c). Again, however, the
pieces of information in (3-b) and (3-c) appear to be associated with the utterance in
(3-a) in different ways.
(3) a. Jack stopped coming to class.
2 In (1-a), the inference to that the hearer has a sister is simply an entailment (where entailment is
standardly defined as follows: a sentence φ entails a sentence ψ iff whenever φ is true then ψ is also
true). Notice that in the case of (1-b), it is standard to also assume that the inference that the hearer
has a sister is an entailment, in addition to being a presupposition. This is because in this particular
unembedded case it also exhibits some properties of entailments. Specifically, it is not suspendable,
as (i) shows. Presuppositions, as we will see momentarily, are instead suspendable.
(i) #Your sister is awesome and you don’t have a sister.
3 Whether the Hey wait a minute! test really tests presuppositionality is controversial. Cases like (i)
appear problematic in this respect (see Chemla 2008 and Romoli 2014 for discussion).
(i) a. John is in NY and he is coming to visit tomorrow.
b. Hey wait a minute! I didn’t even know he was in the US!
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b. Jack doesn’t come now.
c. Jack used to come.
(3-c) represents presupposed content and (3-b) does not.4
One piece of evidence in this respect is that in the same way as above (4-a) is
felicitous but (4-b) is not.5
(4) a. Hey wait a minute! I didn’t know that he used to come.
b. #Hey wait a minute! I didn’t know that he doesn’t come now.
A second test can also be applied. This is based on explicitly asserting (3-b) or (3-c)
before (4-a): in the case of (3-c) the result is felicitous, (5-a), but that of (3-b) is
unnatural, (5-b).
(5) a. Jack used to come to class and stopped coming.
b. #Jack doesn’t come to class now and stopped coming.
This again shows us that the inferences in (3-b) and (3-c) have different discourse
status, despite looking similar on the surface. Information arising as a presupposition
can be asserted before its corresponding presuppositional sentence, while that arising
as entailment cannot. In other words, presuppositions, but not entailments, can be
‘old information’ in this sense. Notice, in passing, that an account for the oddness of
sentences like (5-b) is also needed. The general idea in the literature is assuming an
assertability condition on sentences, which requires a speaker not to assert something
that is already (assumed to be) known by the participants of the conversation. In the
case of (5-b), this condition is violated because the speaker asserts in the first part of
the sentence what the second part also asserts (that Jack doesn’t come to class at the
moment). For different implementations of this idea see Stalnaker 1978, Fox 2008,
Singh 2007, Schlenker 2009, Katzir & Singh 2013, Meyer 2013, Mayr & Romoli
2014 among others.
Beyond words like your and stop presuppositions arise from a variety of other
‘triggers.’ One case discussed from very early on is that of definite descriptions: the
observation is that a sentence like (6-a) presupposes something along the lines of
(6-b) (Strawson 1950 and much subsequent work).6
4 The inference in (3-b) is again simply an entailment of (3-a) as shown by the fact that (i) is contra-
dictory (which in turn shows that when (3-a) is true then (3-b) must also be).
(i) #Jack stopped coming to class and he comes to class now.
5 As it is standard in the Literature, we will indicate unnaturalness/oddness with the diacritic ‘#.’
6 For recent work on definite descriptions see Elbourne 2013, Schwarz 2013.
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(6) a. The current president of Harvard is an historian.
b. Harvard has currently a president.
Other triggers include words like win, also, again or bound morphemes like that
associated with number, gender, tense, and syntactic constructions like it-clefts. In
(7) trough (10) is a very partial set of presuppositional sentences in a, along with
their presuppositions in b.
(7) a. Jack won the Boston marathon.
b. Jack participated in the Boston marathon.
(8) a. Yesterday, Jack showed up late again.
b. Jack showed up late before yesterday.
(9) a. It is Jack who broke the vase
b. Somebody broke the vase.
(10) a. The person over there introduced herself to the president.
b. The person over there is female.
As seen above, presupposed content can represent old information that is already
known to the discourse participants. This observation is the starting point for
the traditional approach to presuppositions. Specifically, this approach conceives
presuppositions as not only allowed to be old information, in the sense above, but
as required to be so. In particular, the idea is that a presuppositional sentence like
(6-a) is only felicitous in contexts in which it is already assumed to be believed by
the conversation participants that there is a president of Harvard. This approach,
which stems from the work of Stalnaker (1973, 1974, 1978), Karttunen (1973, 1974),
and Heim (1982, 1983), characterises presuppositions as constraining the class of
contexts to which the presupposing sentence can be uttered felicitously. In other
words, the presupposition of a sentence S must be ‘satisfied’ in a context for S to
be felicitously asserted in that context. For this reason, this approach is sometimes
called ‘the satisfaction theory of presuppositions.’7
To be more precise about how presuppositions are conceived in the satisfaction
approach, we need to be more precise about how to model contexts. Following
Stalnaker (1973, 1974, 1978, 2002); see also Stalnaker 2014, we can think of a
context as determining, among other things, a common ground, a set of propositions
that are believed to be believed by the conversation participants (if only for the sake
of the conversations). A common ground is, in turn, associated with a set of worlds:
the worlds compatible with each of the propositions in the common ground. In
7 It is standard to include in the satisfaction approach all theories that impose a condition requiring that
the context entail the presuppositions of the asserted sentence. Therefore this approach includes a
variety of other more recent accounts like Schlenker 2008a, 2009 and Fox 2008, 2012 among others.
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Stalnaker’s terminology, this set of worlds is the ‘context set.’ For our purposes, we
can identify a context with the context set it determines, so we will simply use the
term ‘context’ in this way from now on. We can now go back to the idea above and
define presuppositions as in (11).
(11) A sentence S presupposes a proposition p iff for any context c in which S
can be uttered felicitously, c entails p.
So for instance, (6-a) presupposes that there a president of Harvard. In the satisfaction
approach, this becomes a condition on the assertability of a sentence like (6-a): (6-a)
is only felicitous in a context in which it is known (to be commonly known) by the
participants of the conversation that there is a president of Harvard.
As you can imagine, one immediate question for this traditional approach is
what happens if a sentence like (6-a) is uttered in a context in which it is not taken
for granted that Harvard has a president. Indeed, we have the intuition that at least
in some cases we could utter (6-a) in a context in which this information is not
already commonly known. How can a case like this be reconciled with the satis-
faction approach? The standard response, going back to Lewis (1979), is that this
information, if not particularly controversial or relevant for the conversation, could
just be accommodated in the context. Accommodation is a central component of the
satisfaction approach to presuppositions and it has been conceived and implemented
in different ways. For illustration here, we make use of an implementation based on
presupposition theories like Krahmer 1998. Essentially, the idea is that accommo-
dation is an operation, which we will call ACC, and which can apply to utterances
or parts of utterances and transforms the presupposed content into asserted content
(Krahmer 1998, Beaver & Krahmer 2001, Fox 2008,?, 2012, George 2008 among
others). According to this implementation, a sentence like (6-a) is ambiguous: it
could be analysed as in (12-a) and require the context to entail its presuppositions but
it could also be analysed as in (12-b), where ACC transforms the presuppositions of
its arguments in entailments. When analysed as (12-b), (6-a) could be paraphrased
as There is a current president of Harvard and the current president of Harvard is
an historian.8
(12) a. The current president of Harvard is an historian.
b. ACC[The current president of Harvard is an historian]
In sum, we saw that certain inferences that we draw from utterances appear to have
a characteristic discourse status; these inferences are considered to constitute the
8 Notice that while one could conceive the ACC operation to be a purely semantic operation, the
decision as to whether interpret the sentence with or without ACC is pragmatic in nature. So here too
we see a close interaction between semantic and pragmatic ingredients.
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presupposed content of these utterances and are distinguished from inferences which
arise from the asserted content. We also saw that when we conceive of presupposi-
tions as requirements on the context of utterance, like in the satisfaction approach,
we need to assume a process of accommodation, which allows presuppositions be
accommodated in case they happen not to be old information in the context. We
sketched a possible implementation of the accommodation process as insertion of
an accommodation operator, which we called ACC. In the next section, we turn
to the other argument for the division between presupposed and asserted content,
which has to do with the compositional interaction of presuppositions in complex
sentences.9
2 Projection & Dynamic Semantics
2.1 Projecting, Suspending, and Filtering
In the previous section, we considered the distinction between presupposed and
asserted content at the utterance level. Now, we address the fact that presupposed
and asserted content also exhibit distinct behavior in complex sentences. Recall
that presuppositions are generally tied to the presence of a specific lexical trigger,
e.g. the verb stop in (13) (repeated from (3-a) above). The data we turn to in this
section concern sentences where such lexical triggers occur embedded in the scope
of semantic operators. We will now introduce three distinct outcomes from such
a case, following and adapting traditional terminology: the presupposition can 1)
project, i.e. remain unaffected, 2) be filtered, i.e. be modified, or 3) be suspended, i.e.
become part of the asserted content. To illustrate first a case of projection, consider
the sentence in (13) and its inferences in (14-a) and (14-b).
(13) Jack stopped coming to class
(14) a. Jack doesn’t come to class. (asserted content)
b. Jack used to come to class. (presupposed content)
The observation is as follows: when we embed (13) under negation, (15-a), the
antecedent of a conditional, (15-b), a question, (15-c), or a possibility modal (15-d),
the inference to (14-a) does not survive, while that in (14-b) does. In other words,
while (14-a) is only an inference of (13), (14-b) is an inference of both (13) and
9 Notice that in the satisfaction approach mentioned above, presuppositions are not considered primarily
inferences, but more like felicity conditions on contexts of utterance. This notion, however, can also be
reconciled with the idea of presuppositions as inferences that we draw from sentences. This is because
the intuition of a presuppositional inference, in this approach, means that the presupposition was
not already satisfied in the context, but that it was accommodated upon hearing the presuppositional
sentence (see Chemla 2009c, Chemla & Schlenker 2012 for discussion).
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all of (15-a)-(15-d). In the traditional metaphor, (14-b) projects out, when (13) is
embedded in complex sentences like (15-a)-(15-d), while (14-a) does not.
(15) a. Jack didn’t stop coming to class.
b. If Jack stopped coming to class, Mary won’t be happy.
c. Did Jack stop coming to class?
d. It’s possible that Jack stopped coming to class.
Explaning the behavior of presuppositions in complex sentences is also called the
‘projection problem’ of presuppositions. The projection problem is one of the main
problems in the presupposition literature. The task is complicated by the fact that
presuppositions do not always project out of embeddings. As mentioned above, there
are in particular two cases in which projection does not happen and we illustrate
them in turn.
The first type of non-projection, suspension, can be seen with cases like (16).
What (16) shows is that the presupposition that Jack used to come to class does not
project here, or it would be in contradiction with the continuation. In other words,
(16) does not mean what the contradictory (17) means.
(16) Jack didn’t stop coming to class, because he has never come!
(17) #Jack used to come to class and didn’t stop, because he has never come!
The second type of non-projection, filtering, is illustrated by the cases in (18)
and (19). While (18) is another case of projection out of embeddings (i.e., the
presupposition of the consequent, that Mary has a brother, appears to project and
become an inference of the conditional in (18)), this is not the case for (19).10 In
other words, while you would conclude that Mary has a brother upon hearing (18),
you certainly would not infer that from (19).
(18) If Mary comes to visit, she will stay with her brother.
(19) If Mary has a brother, she will stay with her brother.
Analogous patterns can be reproduced with other connectives like conjunction.
Consider for instance (20-a)-(20-b): while we conclude that Mary has a brother from
both (20-a) and (20-b), only in the case in (20-a) this inference is a presupposition.
(20) a. Mary will come to visit and she will stay with her brother.
b. Mary has a brother and she will stay with her brother.
10 See section 3.2 below for issues arising from presupposition projection from the consequent of
conditional sentences.
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To illustrate the difference between (20-a) and (20-b), consider the contrast in (21-a)
versus (21-b): in line with the observations above about the discourse status of
presuppositions and entailments, we can see that the inference that Mary has a
brother behaves as a presupposition in (21-a) but not in (21-b). This is because this
inference is allowed to be old information in (21-a) but not in (21-b).11
(21) a. Mary has a brother and she will come to visit and she will stay with
her brother.
b. #Mary has a brother and she has a brother and she will stay with her
brother.
The question for presupposition theories is how to account for the cases in which
presuppositions do not project, that is for cases in which they are suspended or
filtered.
2.2 Accounting for projection and non-projection
2.2.1 Suspension as local accommodation
The concepts Accommodation and Non-projection are related. More specifically,
cases of what we called suspension, could be thought of as the process of accommo-
dation happening locally, when presupposition triggers are embedded in the scope of
some semantic operators. As we saw, a sentence like (15-a), repeated in (22), has a
reading in which the presupposition appears suspended, as in (16), repeated in (23).
(22) Jack didn’t stop coming to class.
(23) Jack didn’t stop coming to class because he never came!
In the implementation of Accommodation presented above, complex sentences
containing a non-projecting presuppositional trigger can be analyzed with an ACC
operator in an embedded position. So for instance a sentence like (22) could be
associated with either of the three structures in (25).
(24) a. not[Jack stopped coming to class]
b. ACC[not[Jack stopped coming to class]] (global accommodation)
c. not[ACC[Jack stopped coming to class]] (local accommodation)
Whilst (24-a) involves simple projection of the presupposition that Jack used to
come to class, the different scopes of ACC in (24-b) and (24-c) represent different
11 Remember that the infelicity of (21-b) can be accounted for with the assertability condition mentioned
above, requiring asserted information not to be entailed in the context of utterance.
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ways in which the accommodation process can happen. The first case in (24-b) is a
case of what we can call ‘global’ accommodation: since ACC applies after negation
in (24-b), negation doesn’t apply to the presupposition that Jack used to come class.
Therefore the unnegated presupposition becomes part of the asserted content as in
the paraphrase (25).
(25) Jack used to come to class and didn’t stop coming to class.
On the other hand, in (24-c), accommodation happens ‘locally.’ As a consequence,
negation applies after ACC, therefore the presupposition that Jack used to come
to class is part of the asserted content that negation applies to. The interpretation
of representation (24-c) is therefore one that is compatible with Jack never having
come to class as paraphrased in (26).12 This interpretation captures presupposition
suspension and can be brought out if (15-a) is followed by . . . he has never come!
as in (23). In this approach, the problem of presupposition suspension becomes the
problem of where the ACC operator should be merged.
(26) It’s not true that Jack used to come to class and stopped
However, this approach does not straightforwardly extend to the other case of non-
projection, what we called filtering above. To illustrate, let us go back to the type of
cases in (27-a) vs (27-b), repeated from above: where (27-a) involves projection of
the presupposition of the consequent, but (27-b) does not.
(27) a. If Mary comes to visit, she will stay with her brother.
b. If Mary has a brother, she will stay with her brother.
To account for the contrast in (27) in terms of accommodation, one could stipulate
that (27-a) should be analysed as (28-a), involving global accommodation, and
therefore be equivalent to (28-b). Analogously, one could analyse (27-b) as in
(29-a), involving local accommodation this time, so that it would mean roughly
(29-b) and would correctly not give rise to the inference that Mary has a brother.
(28) a. ACC[If Mary comes to visit, she will stay with her brother]
b. Mary has a brother and if she comes to visit, she will stay with him.
(29) a. If Mary has a brother, ACC[she will stay with her brother]
b. If Mary has a brother, she has a brother and will stay with him.
12 There is a well-known asymmetry between the accessibility of the global and local accommodation
readings of a sentence. Recently, this difference has been experimentally shown in processing and
acquisition experiments (Chemla & Bott 2013, Romoli & Schwarz 2014, Bill et al. to appear).
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The question is, of course, why not the other way round. That is, the challenge for
this approach is to tell us what prevents one to analyse (27-b) as (30-a), incorrectly
predicting the meaning in (30-b) and the inference that Mary has a brother.13
(30) a. ACC[If Mary has a brother, she will stay with her brother]
b. Mary has a brother and if she has a brother, she will stay with him.
A second problem for an attempt to explain presupposition filtering by means of
Accommodation is that the putatively accommodated content retains properties of
old information. For instance, one question for this approach would be why (29-a)
is felicitous contrary to (31), which is its corresponding meaning after ACC has
transformed the presupposed into asserted content.
(31) #If Mary has a brother, she has a brother and will stay with her brother
In sum, the idea of accommodating at different levels can account for the presupposi-
tion suspension cases, but not the cases of filtering, or at least not in a straightforward
way.
In the next section, we discuss how filtering and projection are accounted for in
Dynamic Semantics, a particularly successful theory, which is part of the satisfaction
approach described above. Finally, we discuss some of the problems that have
been raised for Dynamic Semantics at the beginning and in more recent years.
Notice that, with respect to the initial Stalnakerian pragmatic characterisation of
presuppositions, Dynamic Semantics pulls presupposition more into the semantics
side of the semantics/pragmatics interface; a move which remains controversial (for
criticism and discussion see Stalnaker 2014, Schlenker 2008a, 2009, Chierchia 2009,
Rothschild 2011 among others).
2.2.2 Updating the context compositionally
Dynamic Semantics was build on the idea that the context of a conversation does not
remain immutable, but changes dynamically as the discourse enfolds. In particular,
any utterances, if accepted by the conversation participants, narrows down the set
of possibilities that are open in the context. More precisely, following Stalnaker,
we can model the way an utterance modifies a context with set intersection: for any
context c and sentence S, the (felicitous) utterance of S in c produces a context c′
which is equivalent to the intersection of c with the intension associated to S. In
13 One option to explore in this respect, following ideas in Gazdar (1979) and subsequent work in
the DRT framework (van der Sandt 1992, Geurts 1996, 1999 among others), would be to have an
interplay between the implicatures/appropriateness conditions of conditionals and presupposition
projection. For discussion and criticism of this approach, see Heim 1990, Beaver 2010.
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symbols, c∩λw[[S]]w (where ∩ is standard set-intersection and λw[[S]]w represents
the intension of S - a function from possible worlds to truth-values). Dynamic
semantics captures directly the notion of old information that we introduced above:
after the successful utterance of a sentence S, any information S contributed is part
of the new context c′. In a sequence of sentences such as (32), then, the information
contributed by the first counts as old information for the second sentence, and thereby
satisfies the presupposition.
(32) John used to come to class. Now he stopped.
Dynamic semantics extends the idea that a prior sentence provides a context for the
evaluation of a later sentence to sentence internal interpretation. For example, it
seeks to develop an account of the two examples in (33) where just as in (32) the
presupposition of stop is satisfied by the initial clause.
(33) a. John used to come to class and now he stopped.
b. If John used to come to class, he stopped now.
Developing this intuition, Heim 1982, 1983 proposed to identify the meaning of
sentences with the way they can change a context—i.e. their Context Change Poten-
tials. Using this approach, she provided an account of when presupposition projects
and when they are filtered. In the following, we illustrate the idea for the cases
of conjunction and negation, but generalizations of the approach to several others
connectives and operators are discussed by Heim (1992), Beaver (2001) and others.
First, dynamic semantics assumes that an embedded presuppositional sentence
has no truth-value if uttered in a context that doesn’t satisfy its presuppositions.
Following for example Heim & Kratzer (1998), we model presuppositions a partial
functions within the framework of model-theoretic semantics. Partial functions
are neither true nor false in certain contexts, but undefined in the contexts where a
presupposition is not satisfied. We adopt from Heim & Kratzer 1998 the notation
in (34) for a partial function. The condition between the colon and the dot defines
the domain of the function, while the term following the dot describes the value.
Specifically, in (34) c is of type st, |Sp| of type 〈st,st〉 and Sp is the sentence S that
has p as its complete presupposition. (34) represents a partial function from contexts
which entails S’s presuppositions to contexts in which S is true. Provided that c⊆ p,
the update of a context c with a sentence Sp is the intersection of c with the set of
worlds that Sp is true in.
(34) |Sp|= λc : c⊆ p︸ ︷︷ ︸
domain
. c∩{w : [[S]]w = 1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
value
12
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So for instance, the meaning of a presuppositional sentence like (35-a), repeated
from above, is a partial function from contexts which satisfy (35-a)’s presupposition
(35-b) to contexts in which it is true that Jack stopped coming to class. Therefore,
the result of updating a context c with (35-a) is shrinking c to the subset of c-worlds
in which it is true that Jack stopped coming to class, provided that c entailed that
Jack used to come to class in the first place.
(35) a. Jack stopped coming to class.
b. Jack used to come to class.
This basic condition in (35) captures the idea of presupposition as conditions on
contexts by Stalnaker. So far we only looked at atomic sentences; when we move
to complex sentences, we need an account of how the context change potentials
of complex sentences is determined from those of their parts. The initial idea in
Dynamic Semantics was that once we define, for each connective and operator, how
they contribute to the composition of context change potentials, this will automat-
ically derive when presuppositions project and when they do not. In other words,
by defining how the assertion parts of sentences compose, we would derive how the
presupposition parts do. We will come back to this claim in section 3.1. For now
let’s consider how, in the case of negation and conjunctions, this is accomplished.
Consider negation first. The effect of updating a sentence of the form ‘not S’
to a context c is to subtract from c the worlds in which S is true. It is the way in
which this is obtained, however, that is crucial for presuppositions: first we interset
the context c with S and then we subtract the worlds in the intersection from c. In
other worlds, the operation in set theoretic terms is the following: c− (c∩S). What
is crucial here is that the update of the context with not S contains in its specification
the update of the context with S, in symbols: |S|(c). The latter, in turn, will only be
possible if the context presupposes all of S’s presuppositions. This last bit, therefore,
correctly predicts that not S will inherit all of S’s presuppositions. The task for
Dynamic Semantics is then to define the context change potential of not S in a way
that adequately reflects our intuitions about its truth-conditions and presuppositions:
(36) |not Sp|(c) = c−|Sp|(c)
(36) correctly predicts that (37-a) inherits the presuppositions of its positive coun-
terpart, (37-b): that Jack used to come to class. Again, this is because updating the
context c with |not S| requires that we first update c with S. But as we know, this latter
update requires S’s presuppositions to be satisfied. In this way, indirectly a negated
sentence like (37-a) inherits all the presuppositions of its positive counterpart.
(37) a. Jack didn’t stop coming to class.
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b. Jack stopped coming to class.
Consider now the case of conjunction and let us go back to cases like (33-a), repeated
from above. The relevant generalisation about (38) was that the presuppositions of
the second conjunct are not projected to the whole conjunction if they are entailed
by the information of the first conjunct. In other words, (38) doesn’t presuppose
what its second conjunct presupposes, that John used to come to class, because this
is entailed by the first conjunct.
(38) John used to come to class and now he stopped.
The task for Dynamic semantics is to define a context change potential of conjunction
which can account for the just mentioned generalisation. In order to do so, the
following definition of the context change potential of a conjunctive sentence is
standardly assumed:
(39) |S1 and S2|(c) = |S2|(|S1|(c))
Definition (39) requires that in updating a context c with a conjunction S1 and S2
we first update c with S1 and then we update the resulting context with S2. This
immediately predicts that while S1 is uttered in the context of c, S2 is (as if it is)
uttered in a derived context, call it c′, which corresponds to c∩λw[[S1]]w. In turn,
(39) correctly predicts that the presupposition of S1 will have to be satisfied in c
for S1 to be defined, but that of S2 only needs to be satisfied in c′. To illustrate
these predictions with a concrete example, consider again the sentence in (38):
according to (39), (38) can be uttered in any context, despite the fact that the second
conjunct, John stopped coming to class, is presuppositional. This is because any
context c updated with the first conjunct, John used to come to class, will entail the
presupposition of the second conjunct (that John used to come to class). In other
words, the presupposition of the second conjunct is correctly predicted to be filtered
if the initial context updated with the first conjunct entails it.
The brief reconstruction above was just a sketch and there are a variety of details
that one can implement in different ways. Moreover, one has to define systematically
the context-change potentials of all connectives, modals, and quantifiers in a way
that it links the projection properties of sentences and the way their assertion parts
are composed. Once generalised in this way, however, the dynamic approach has
been one of the most successful approach to account for the projection problem of
presuppositions.
Before going to some challenges to this approach, it is important to notice that
while it provides an account of presupposition projection and presupposition filtering,
it still requires an extra mechanism to account for the cases of presupposition
suspension like (40), repeated from above.
14
Presupposition and accommodation
(40) John didn’t stopped coming to class, because he never came!
The mechanism adopted is an implementation of Lewis’ idea of accommodating
presuppositions. However, rather than changing the sentence, like the ACC operator
introduced above does, the idea is changing the context to which the sentence is
updated. That is to say, the accommodation process acts on the context by modifying
it so that it winds up entailing the relevant presupposition. Moreover, in parallel
to how ACC can be merged at different levels in a sentence, this accommodation
process can also apply at different levels. In particular, in the case of (40), a change
is required not in the global context against which the entire sentence is uttered,
but rather in a more local context, that of the sentential argument of negation. To
illustrate, remember that the context change potential of negation for a sentence
like not Sp was c−|Sp|(c). This local accommodation process is assumed to apply
before the |Sp| is updated, so that the presupposition is satisfied in that local context.
We can formulate this as in (41).
(41) |not[John stopped coming to class]|(c)
= c−|John stopped coming|(c) meaning of neg
= c−|John stopped coming|(c∩λw[[John used to come]]w) local acc
= c− (c∩λw[[John used to come]]w∩λw[[John stopped coming]]w)
More concretely, what happens is the sentence embedded in the scope of negation,
John stopped coming to class, is updated to a context that is modified to entail the
presupposition that John used to come. Negation then applies excluding worlds
in which John used to come and stopped, so resulting in a context in which either
never came to class or used to come and didn’t stop. This context is then compatible
with the continuation that John never came to class. Through this process of (local)
accommodation, Dynamic Semantics can then account for data like (40).14
3 Extensions and Challenges to Dynamic Semantics
Though dynamic semantics has arguably been the most influential account of pre-
supposition over the last 30 years, a variety of problems have been pointed out for
the approach. In this section we review some of them and we point to the responses
proposed in the literature.
3.1 Asymmetry of and
One important problem for Dynamic Semantics regards the relationship between
how in a complex sentence the assertion and presupposition component of its parts
14 See von Fintel 2008 for a critical discussion of local accommodation in Dynamic Semantics.
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are composed - which is just another way of saying when presuppositions project
and when they do not. In particular, the problem has to do with the claim reviewed
above that the projection of presuppositions can simply be derived by giving a
truth-conditionally adequate formulation of how the assertion components of a
sentence are put together compositionally . To illustrate the issue, let us go back
to conjunction. Consider the sentences in (42-a) and (42-b), which presuppose that
John has a sister and that she is in town, respectively. Now, consider the conjunction
of (41-a) and (41-b) in (42).
(42) a. John’s sister is in town
b. John discovered that she is in town.
(43) John’s sister is in town and John discovered that she is in town.
Recall that in defining the context change potential of (43) in terms of its parts in
(42-a) and (42-b) we want to obtain two results. First, we want the net result to
reflect our intuitions that a context updated with a conjunction of two sentences
should be narrowed in such a way that any world in which either of the two sentences
is not true should be discarded. In other words, we want the update of a context
c with (43) to be just those worlds of c in which both (42-a) and (42-b) are true.
That is, those worlds in which John’s sister is in town and that John has come to
know this. Moreover, intuitively, (43) still presupposes that John has a sister (the
presupposition of (42-a)) but not that she is in town (the presupposition of (42-b)).
So we want our definition of the context change potential to reflect this intuition.
The initial claim in dynamic semantics was that the presupposition projection
properties of a complex sentence like (43) follow directly from defining a context
change potential that is truth-conditionally adequate. For instance, the context
change potential proposed for a conjunction of the form S1 and S2 is as in (44).
(44) |S1 and S2|= |S2|(|S1(c))
As seen above, (44) requires that we first update the context c with the first conjunct
and correctly predicts that the presuppositions of the first conjunct have to be
satisfied in c. As a consequence, the presuppositions of the first conjunct are correctly
predicted to project to the whole conjunction. On the other hand, the second conjunct
does not update the initial context c, but it rather updated c intersected with the first
conjunct, call it c′. Thus this predicts that this derived context c′, not c, has to satisfy
the presuppositions of the second conjunct. As a consequence, if the presuppositions
of the second conjunct are entailed by the first conjunct, we predict that they will
always be satisfied in c′, no matter what the initial context c is.
The explanation above appears to elegantly link how truth-conditions are ob-
tained compositionally and presupposition projection. As Soames (1989), Irene
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Heim herself (Heim 1990), and more recently Schlenker (2008a, 2009) have pointed
out, however, when we look closely the link is not tight enough. This is because
we can define a context change potential for a conjunction like (43) that is as truth-
conditionally adequate as (44) (i.e., it narrows down the context in the same way),
but it does not make the right prediction for presupposition projection. One example
of this is (45): (45) is a simple variant of (44) above, but the two conjuncts are
updated in a different order. The crucial point is that (45) still predicts that, in the
end, the worlds of c that remain are only those compatible with both S1 and S2. This
makes (45) a truth-conditionally adequate.
(45) |S1 and S2|= |S1|(|S2(c))
However, the predictions of presuppositions are not adequate and are as follows: c
should presuppose what S1 and S2 presuppose unless S2 entails the presuppositions
of S1. If these predictions were correct, a sentence like (46) should be natural and
non-presuppositional, as the presupposition of the first conjunct should be filtered
by the second one.
(46) #John’s sister is in town and John has a sister.
On the contrary, (46) is odd.15 Its symmetric version in (47), on the other hand, is
natural and presuppositionless.
(47) John has a sister and John’s sister is in town.
This contrast is an argument for adopting (44) rather than (45). The problem is that
they are truth-conditionally equivalent, therefore it is not true that presupposition
projection is derived in Dynamic Semantics simply by adequately defining how the
assertion component of sentences are to be put together compositionally.
This explanatory challenge for Dynamic Semantics has sparked an intense debate
in the literature in recent years and triggered a variety of responses, departing more
or less radically from the dynamic approach (see Schlenker 2008a, 2009, Fox 2008,
2012, George 2008, Chemla 2010, Rothschild 2011; see also Schlenker 2008b for
a summary of the debate). Within the dynamic approach, Rothschild (2011) and
Schlenker (2009) have proposed a way of constraining context change potentials
that does not suffer from the explanatory problem above. We refer the reader to
their papers for details, but in a nutshell the idea is that a sentence like (43) can
be thought of being associated with both (44) and (45) but on top of this there is a
general independent ordering constraint which favours the former over the latter.
15 The oddness of (46) can be explained if we consider that one presumably is forced to accommodate a
presupposition that John has a sister in the global context, which makes the second conjunct redundant
(cf. footnote 5).
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This constraint can be implemented in different ways, but usually it is conceived as
being based on linear order. The idea is that a sentence is processed incrementally as
it is heard and it is this that creates an asymmetry between the conjunct coming first,
the first conjunct, and the one coming last, the second conjunct (Schlenker 2008a,
2009). This, in turn, affects how presuppositions are filtered, in a more general and
indirect way than in the dynamic approach, where the asymmetry is encoded directly
in the meaning of connectives and quantifiers.
3.2 Conditional presuppositions
In this section, we put aside the problem of asymmetry discussed above, and we focus
on the prediction of the dynamic approach for cases in which the presupposition
trigger appears in the consequent of a conditional. We saw above that Dynamic
Semantics predicts that the presuppositions of the second conjunct of a conjunction
project unless they are entailed by the first conjunct. In other words, we could
express the predicted presupposition of a conjunction of the form in (48) to be that
the conditional presupposition that if q then p has to be the case.
(48) q and Sp
As we saw above, this correctly predicts that (49-a), repeated from above, presup-
poses nothing. More precisely, it only presupposes the tautological (49-b), hence it
does not impose any restriction on the class of contexts in which it can be uttered.
(49) a. Mary has a brother and she will come with her brother.
b. If Mary has a brother, Mary has brother.
On the other hand, the dynamic account predicts that (50-a) presupposes (50-b). But
(50-b) appears too weak as it stands: intuitively, we would want to infer from (50-a)
that Mary has a brother. The problem in this particular case, however, does not arise
because the asserted conjunction in (50-a) entails that Mary doesn’t want to come
alone, therefore from the latter and the conditional presupposition in (50-b) we can
indeed conclude that Mary has a brother. The combination of an entailment of the
assertion and the conditional presupposition could be the source of our intuition that
(50-b) gives rise to the inference that Mary has a brother.
(50) a. Mary doesn’t want to come alone and she will come with her brother.
b. If Mary doesn’t want to come alone, Mary has brother.
When we turn to conditionals, however, the issue just sketched for conjunctions
reemerges in a more problematic way. To illustrate, consider the corresponding
conditionals of the two conjunctions above, in (51-a) and (52-a). It is easy to show
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that the dynamic account predicts also in this case the conditional presuppositions in
(51-b) and (52-b).
(51) a. If Mary has a brother, she will come with her brother.
b. If Mary has a brother, Mary has a brother.
(52) a. If Mary doesn’t want to come alone, she will come with her brother.
b. If Mary doesn’t want to come alone, she has a brother
While the prediction appears entirely correct for (51-a), it is clearly wrong for (52-b).
Moreover, contrary from the case of conjunction, in the case of conditionals there is
no entailment of the assertion that comes to rescue. That is to say, (52-a) does not
entail that Mary doesn’t want to come alone.
It is easy to construct a similar contrast involving a case in which the conditional
presupposition appears correct, (53-a), or too weak, (54-a) (Perez-Carballo 2008).16
(53) a. If Paul is a devout catholic, he will read his Bible tonight.
b. If Paul is a devout catholic, he has a Bible
(54) a. If Paul is tired tonight, he will read his Bible tonight.
b. If Paul is tired tonight, he has a Bible
We are left with the problem that the predicted projected presupposition from the
consequent of a conditional sentence appears correct in some cases, (53-a), but too
weak in others, (54-a). This challenge to the dynamic approach is usually referred to
as ‘the proviso problem’ - a term introduced by Geurts (1996, 1999). The task faced
by the dynamic approach is to account for when a conditional sentence of the form
if q and Sp should give rise to the weak conditional inference q→ p and when it be
associated to the stronger unconditional inference p.
The response to this problem is to derive the non-conditional presupposition
on top of the conditional one, as a separate mechanism. Proposals along this line
either derive the unconditional inference as an extra pragmatic inference on top
of the weaker conditional presupposition or allow the accommodation component
to directly accommodate the unconditional presupposition in certain contexts, see
Karttunen & Peters 1979; van Rooij 2007, Perez-Carballo 2008, von Fintel 2008,
16 The conditional inference in (53-b) is a genuine presupposition in that it shows the discourse and
projective properties outlined above in the introduction. First, it can be old information in the context,
(i), and it appears to project from further embeddings like (ii) (Schlenker 2011).
(i) If Paul is a devout catholic he has a Bible and if he is a devout Catholic, he will read his bible
tonight
(ii) If Paul is a devout catholic, will he read his bible tonight?
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Heim 2006, Singh 2007, 2008, Schlenker 2011 among others; see also Romoli et al.
2011 and Chemla & Schlenker 2011 for related experimental work on presupposition
projection in conditional sentences.
3.3 Differences among triggers
Theories of presuppositions like Dynamic Semantics traditionally treat all presuppo-
sitions uniformly. And indeed presuppositions do behave uniformly in most cases.
For instance, consider the case of win. As seen above, a sentence with win like
(55-a), its negation in (55-b), its questioned version in (55-c), and a conditional
or a possibility modal embedding (55-a) like (55-d) and (55-e), all give rise to the
inference that John participated in the Boston marathon.
(55) a. Jack won the Boston marathon.
b. Bill didn’t win the Boston marathon.
c. Did Bill win the Boston marathon?
d. It’s possible that Bill won the Boston marathon.
e. If Bill won the Boston marathon, he will celebrate tonight.
If we consider any other presupposition trigger discussed above, we can reproduce
the same projection behaviour. For instance, if we consider it-clefts, we can see that
each of (56-a)-(56-e) give rise to the inference that somebody broke the computer in
the same way.
(56) a. It is Mary who broke that computer.
b. It isn’t Mary who broke that computer.
c. Is it Mary who broke that computer?
d. It’s possible that it is Mary who broke that computer.
e. If it is Mary who broke that computer, she should repair it.
In these examples, we observe that presuppositions behave uniformly in their pro-
jection behaviour through propositional connectives, modals, and questions as most
approaches would lead us to expect. Despite their similarity, however, as discussed
since Karttunen 1971 and Stalnaker 1974, there appear to be differences in the
behaviour of certain triggers.
One first example of a difference in projection between triggers was discussed by
Heim (1991), Sauerland (2008) and Percus (2008), who showed that in a number of
cases two members of a pair with complementary presuppositions exhibit differences
in their projection behavior. For instance, Sauerland (2003, 2008) discusses the
difference between singular and plural marking of nouns. (57-a)/(57-b) show the
presuppositions without projection: the singular variant presupposes that John has
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exactly one sister, while the indefinite variant presupposes that he has more than one.
(57) a. John invited his sister.
 John has exactly one sister
b. John invited his sisters.
 John has more than one sister
(58-a)/(58-b) show the corresponding projection of the two triggers above from the
scope of a universal quantifier. Projection of the presupposition of the singular
results in the universal presupposition that every student has exactly one sister. The
plural, however, projects to a weaker, existential presupposition, namely that at least
one student has more than one sister.
(58) Every student invited his sister
 Every student has exactly one sister
(58) Every student invited his sisters
At least one student has more than one sister
Similar contrasts obtain for other pairs of presupposition triggers that yield comple-
mentary presuppositions when they are not embedded.
A second example was discussed by Abusch (2002, 2010), who introduced a
distinction between two classes of presupposition triggers that she refers to as ‘soft’
and ‘hard’ triggers. This distinction is based on two differences. The first difference
has to do with the ease of suspension of the presupposition associated with a trigger.
This can be brought about via creating a context in which the speaker is evidently
ignorant about the presupposition; those triggers that do not give rise to infelicity in
such contexts are soft triggers. Consider the following two examples modeled on
Abusch 2010 that show that according to this diagnostic win and it-clefts are soft
and hard triggers respectively.
(59) I don’t know whether Bill ended up participating in the Marathon yesterday.
But if he won, he will celebrate tonight.
(60) I don’t know whether anybody broke that computer.
#But if it is Mary who did it, she should repair it.
The second difference has to do with the projection behaviour in quantificational
sentences. While as we saw the presuppositions of soft and hard triggers appear to
pattern alike with respect to the projection behavior when embedded in connectives,
modals, and questions, they behave differently when embedded in quantificational
sentences. The gist of the observation, due to Charlow (2009), is that while hard
presuppositions appear to project uniformly universally in quantificational sentences,
the force of the projection inference of soft presuppositions depends on the quantifier
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involved. So, for instance, if we consider also, which patterns like it-clefts in explicit
ignorance contexts, we observe that all of (61-a)-(61-d) give rise to the universal
inference that each of these students smoke something other than Marlboro.
(61) a. Each of these students also smokes [Marlboro]F .
b. None of these students also smokes [Marlboro]F .
c. More/Less than three of these students also smoke [Marlboro]F .
d. Some of these students also smokes [Marlboro]F .
On the other hand, when we turn to stop, which patterns with win in the suspen-
sion contexts above, we find a non-uniform behaviour depending on the quantifier
involved. In other words, (62-a) and (62-b) give rise to the inference that each of
these students used to smoke; (63-a) and (63-b), on the other hand, do not give rise
to the same universal inference. This pattern has also been shown experimentally by
Chemla 2009a.
(62) a. Each of these students stopped smoking.
b. None of these students stopped smoking.
(63) a. More/Less than three of these students stopped smoking.
b. Some of these students stopped smoking.
While the boundaries of the soft vs. hard distinction are controversial (see Abbott
2006 and Klinedinst 2010 for discussion), the division between weak and hard
presupposition triggers is widely accepted (but see Abrusán 2014 for a recent criti-
cism of the distinction). The challenge for dynamic semantics is to account for this
difference in behaviour among presupposition triggers.
Several researchers have attempted to explain the division by different mecha-
nisms by bringing soft triggers closer to implicatures. To illustrate the gist of the
idea consider the sentence in (64-a) and its negative counterpart in (64-b). As seen
above, the relevant data point to explain here is that both (64-a) and (64-b) give
rise to the same inference in (65). In a traditional approach to presuppositions like
Dynamic Semantics, this is explained by assuming that (65) is a presupposition of
the sentence in (64-a), which then project from under negation in the case of (64-b).
(64) a. Bill won the Marathon.
b. Bill didn’t win the Marathon.
(65) Bill participated in the Marathon.
The recent approaches mentioned above would instead explain the fact that (65) is
both an inference of (64-a) and (64-b) very differently: the idea is that first (65) is
just an entailment of (64-b) and, second, (65-b) is an IMPLICATURE of (64-b) (can
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we refer here another article about implicatures in the book?). In a nutshell, the
implicature is derived by assuming that (64-b) and (66) compete with each other,
in such a way that upon hearing (64-b) the hearer will conclude that (66) is false,
thereby concluding (65) (=it’s false that Bill didn’t participate in the Marathon).
(66) Bill didn’t participate in the Marathon.
By characterising the inferences of soft triggers like win in this way, these recent
approaches hope to capture the differences between soft and hard triggers mentioned
above; for discussion see Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000, Simons 2001, Abusch
2002, 2010, Chemla 2009b, 2010, Romoli 2014; for experimental work challenging
this approach see Chemla & Bott 2013, Romoli & Schwarz 2014, Bill et al. to
appear.17
3.4 Differences among quantifiers
Filtering by quantifiers is perhaps the most difficult area of presupposition theory.
Already Heim (1982, 1983) discusses a difference between universal and existential
quantifiers illustrated in (67). Her claim is that universal quantification as in (67-a)
projects the universal presupposition that all European countries cherish their king,
the existential statement in (67-b) only projects the presupposition that the one
relevant fat man has a bicycle.
(67) a. Every/No European country cherishes its king.
b. A fat man was pushing his bicycle.
Part of the difficulty of this area has been to ascertain the basic data, Beaver (1994,
2001) disputes Heim’s claim concerning universal quantification. Recently though,
Chemla (2009b,a) corroborated and extended Heim’s generalization through experi-
mental investigation (see also Sudo et al. 2011).
In addition to differences between quantifiers, quantification and presupposition
have been shown to interact in more complex ways. Consider the phenomenon
Sauerland (2013) refers to as ‘weakened projection.’ Gender marking on bound
pronouns generally exhibits a projection behavior similar to presuppositions as
Stechow (2003), Heim (2008), Sauerland (2008) and Sudo (2012) discuss. For
example, (68) leads to an inference that all the students are female.
(68) None of the students except Sue embarrassed herself.
17 For different takes on the soft-hard distinction see Abbott 2006, Klinedinst 2010, Fox 2012 among
others.
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However, the same pattern doesn’t obtain in (69) where the focus sensitive particle
only is used to express quantification. This pattern has led to accounts where
focus particle quantification differs in its interaction with presupposition from other
quantificational operators.
(69) Only Sue embarrassed herself.
4 Concluding remarks
In this short paper, we could only scratch the surface of Presupposition and Accom-
modation, which remain widely studied phenomena in the semantics/pragmatics
literature and related fields. For other introductions to Presuppositions and Accom-
modation see Beaver & Geurts 2011, Beaver 2001, Beaver & Zeevat 2007, von
Fintel 2008. More recently, presuppositions have started being investigated through
psycholinguistic methods more and more, for a recent survey of the different studies
see Schwarz 2014.
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